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Karol Berger 
The Text and Its Author 
The question I shall consider here is whether the author of a work of art belongs to the world presented in the 
work. Before I can discuss this question, however, I have to explain very briefly how I shall be using some of 
the fundamental terms of the discussion, namely, «text», «work», «world», «voice», «personage», and 
«narrator». 1 Since my argurnent will depend on the assurnption that most, though not all, of the music is 
representational, I should begin by recapitulating the reasons, presented at greater length elsewhere, why I 
consider this assumption plausible. 
In Painting as an Art, Richard Wollheim argued that we should consider abstract painting as a species of 
representational art, because, just as in figurative painting, also in abstract painting we see not only the real 
object, the two-dimensional surface covered with paint, but also the imaginary represented world, the imaginary 
three-dimensional space with (abstract) objects in it.2 In Mimesis as Make-Be/ieve, Kendall Walton pointed out 
that, for analogous reasons, most of music, including purely instrumental music, should also be considered 
representational, since also in music we make the distinction between the real object, the actual sounds we hear, 
and the imaginary represented world which appears when we hear these sounds as constituting lines of directed 
tension and motion, as figures appearing against a more or less distinct ground.3 
Now, in all representational media, whether visual (like sculpture and painting), or aural (music), or both 
visual and aural (language), we must distinguish between a real physical object produced in the process of 
encoding an experience in a medium and an imaginary represented object which is seen or heard in the real one 
when this is decoded. While there is no general agreement on how to call these entities, for the duration of this 
paper Iet us call them, respectively, the «work» and the «world» represented in the work. A musical work, for 
instance, would consist of the actual sounds produced by the musicians, while the world represented by this 
work would consist of the imaginary lines of directed motion heard against a more or Iess distinct 
accompanimental background (lines the explicit presentation of which is often the task of Schenker-inspired 
analysis). 
Much of music can, of course, exist very weil without any written notation. Writing is a tool some 
musicians use, typically when they want others to play their music, or when they want to play the music of 
other musicians. When a musical work is written down, it becomes an entity for which we, again, do not have a 
generally accepted name, but which for the duration of this paper Iet us agree to call the «text». Now, visual 
media do not produce texts, in this sense of the term; they know only real works and imaginary worlds. The 
only medium other than music that knows texts is language. But there is one fundamental difference between 
musical and Iinguistic texts, a difference that goes to the center of the distinction between these two media. 
Unlike music, which is an inescapably aural medium, language can be embodied equally weil in sound or in 
writing: in language, but not in music, an understanding of an inscription can bypass the medium of sound. 
(Thus, there is a grain of truth hidden among all the exaggerations of Derrida's 0/ Grammato/ogy.4) In other 
words, in Ianguage, the written text and the aural or written work are equally prirnordial; in music, the text is 
essentially an optional set of visually fixed instructions for producing what truly matters, the work. This 
difference between the two media is surely linked to the referentiality of language: we shall grasp to what a 
sentence refers regardless of whether the sentence is embodied in sound or in ink. The Iack of reference makes 
this independence from a specific embodiment impossible in music. 
Let us call the Ianguage user implied by any act of speech the «voice». A linguistic work must present its 
content by means ofat least one immediately speaking voice, and it may employ many such voices. Similarly, 
vocal music presents its content primarily by means of voices, that is, melodic lines carried by human voices, 
and, by analogy, also instrumental music presents its content primarily by means of voices, that is, individual 
melodic lines. 
In a literary work, an immediately speaking voice may belong to a «personage», that is, a speaker who is 
himselfa part ofthe world his speech presents (as happens in the dramatic mode), or it may belong to a «narra-
tor», that is, a speaker who teils us of a world of which he himself is not a part (as happens in the diegetic 
mode). Both the personage and the narrator belong to the world presented in the linguistic work, but while the 
world presented dramatically may be a single world, the world presented diegetically must consist of at least two 
distinct and hierarchically related ontological levels, the world to which the narrator belongs and the different, 
subordinated, world which he presents. lt is clear that also a musical voice can be thought to belong to a person-
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age. The vexed and much-discussed question whether it can also sometimes belong to a narrator need not detain 
us here. 
The «setting» described by any of the voices used, the personage, and the narrator exhaust the I ist of 
categories of elements that may constitute, singly or in various combinations, the world presented in a linguistic 
work. The two additional candidates for inclusion on the !ist are the real author of the work and its so-called 
«implied authorn and their claims should be considered now. 
Let us call the real author of the work simply the «authorn and disregard the questions of whether the author 
is known or anonymous, a single person or a collective. In written literature, the author is, obviously, the 
creator ofthe immediately speaking «voices» he employs to present the world of his work, but, less obviously, 
himself does not belong to this world. That he does not is shown by the fact that his «now» is not the same, 
does not refer to the same time, as the «now» of the speakers. Note that this is the case even in the most 
scrupulously honest autobiography: the real world of the real author is not the same as the world of the narrator 
the author presents, just as the world of the narrator is not the same as the world of the personage the narrator 
presents in his story. The act of writing fixes the narrator's «now» forever in the steadily receding past of the 
real world to which the author belongs. (Oral literature, like improvised music, raises in this respect special 
problems for poetics, problems that will not be addressed here. 5) There is only one sense in which the author 
may enter the world presented in his work. He can do it in the same way as any real person or object can, 
namely, as the model of a portrait, that is, by becoming a personage, or the narrator, or both. In other words, the 
author may use a personage, narrator, or both as a vehicle for a portrait, including an autoportrait. In the same 
way, a real place may serve as the model for the setting. The questions ofwhether any part ofthe real world is 
portrayed in the work and whether the portrait is accurate are empirical and we have to answer them individually 
in each specific case as best we can and if we can. But even when a portrait or autoportrait is presented, no new 
category needs to be added to our List of elements of the presented world over and above those of the setting, 
personage, and narrator. 
Those, however, who claim that the author is apart of the work's world have much more than a portrait in 
mind. For them, the world presented in the work implies in some way a consciousness from whose point of 
view this world is seen . This voiceless, implied but not explicitly presented and heard, consciousness is often 
referred to as the «implied authorn, the term, though not the concept, introduced in 1961 by Wayne Booth. 6 In 
his 1974 book, The Composer 's Voice, Edward T. Cone postulated the existence of something analogous to the 
implied author in music.7 While my discussion will deal explicitly only with linguistic works, it should be 
apparent that if my arguments against the need for believing in the existence of the implied author in literature 
are convincing, they are equally valid also in the case of music. 
Two arguments for postulating the existence ofthe implied author are commonly brought forward. First, it is 
clairned that only the existence ofthe irnplied author can account for texts that imply something eise from what 
their voices explicitly say. In particular, in those demonstrable cases where the narrator is unreliable, we can be-
come aware ofthis unreliability, so the argument goes, only because the narrator's norms are different than those 
ofthe implied author who is the source ofthe norms of the text as a whole. 1 believe, however, that we do not 
need to invoke the existence ofthe author, irnplied or real, to account for such cases. A speaker (whether a real 
person, or a presented narrator or personage) is unreliable, when we cannot take what he says at its face value, 
and we cannot take it at its face value, when we have reasons to believe that he knowingly lies, unknowingly 
makes a mistake, or is ironic. We become aware that the speaker may not be telling the truth (whether 
knowingly or not), when we realize that what he says about some aspects ofthe world he speaks of is intemally 
inconsistent, or inconsistent with what we otherwise know about these aspects, or implausible in view of what 
we otherwise know about comparable aspects of comparable worlds. And we become aware that the speaker may 
be ironic, when we realize that he or a person of this kind would not be likely to say in earnest what he had just 
said. In all of these cases we need only to place what the speaker says in an appropriate context, a context 
provided by what we otherwise know about him and the world he speaks of, or about people like him and 
comparable worlds. We certainly do not need to postulate the existence ofan implied authorial consciousness. 
The second argument in favor ofthe existence of the implied author is based on the observation that even a 
work created by a group ofreal people may seem to present its world from a single vantage point. The claim is 
that this consistency ofthe point ofview can be explained only when we assume that the text irnplies a single 
authorial consciousness. This argument, however, is even less convincing. The alleged consistency of the point 
of view is simply identical with the consistency of the presented world. In fact, there is no hope that we could 
ever separate fruitfully the world presented in the work from the point of view from which it is presented. The 
world presented in the work does not exist anywhere apart from the work, that is, it is given always only 
together with the perspective from which it is presented and cannot be seen from any other. We have no way of 
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finding out independently of the work how many children Lady Macbeth had, just as we shall never leam 
whether Cezanne's apple had been bitten on the other side. To be sure, one could convincingly argue that the 
world ofthe work and the standpoint from which it is seen may be differentiated, because the world, although 
unique and existing nowhere eise but in the work, is sufficiently similar to the real world of our everyday 
experience and to the worlds we know from other works to make it possible for us to imagine how it would be 
like to look at it from another perspective. This is shown by the fact that, while we cannot answer the questions 
about Lady Macbeth's children or Cezanne's apples, we can coherently, if idly, entertain them and we are 
understood, though not necessarily commended, when we do. Beyond its explicit content, the work engages the 
reader's (spectator's, listener's) general experience of other worlds, real and presented. The implicit perspective 
from which the world ofthe work is seen can be recognized as, precisely, a perspective because, and only when, 
the reader's general experience of other worlds is activated. We can recognize the perspective only because we 
could imagine another, because we know from experience that things might be seen from a different angle. But it 
is precisely the dismally idle quality of all such imaginings that teils us that the separation of the presented 
world from the point ofview can never be fruitful. By saying that Lady Macbeth «is seen by her implied author 
as» evil we express nothing that we had not already conveyed when we said simply that she «is» evil. Even if it 
is true that the world of the work is presented from a perspective, there is nothing we can say in describing the 
perspective that we do not also and more s1mply say in describing the world. lt is not the Sophoclean 
perspective but the world of Antigone that is tragic. 
Thus, for all practical purposes, the consistency of the point of view from which the world of the work is 
presented is identical with the consistency of the presented world. Now we clearly do not need to assume the 
existence of the implied author to understand how the latter sort of consistency had been achieved. The real 
author ofthe work may choose to aim at achieving it or not, and he may prove successful at his chosen task or 
not, regardless of whether he is an individual or a collective creator. lf anything, the fuct that a collective real 
author is occasionally successful at presenting a consistent world demonstrates how little relevance our 
knowledge ofthe author has for our knowledge ofthe presented world. Once again, the existence of the implied 
author tums out tobe a theoretical fiction with no useful task to perform. Ostensibly, its task was to explain the 
consistency of the presented world, but in fact it tumed out tobe simply another name for this consistency. The 
need to invoke this name is likely to have religious roots. 
lt should be noted, incidentally, that the author, whether individual or collective, is greatly aided in the task 
of presenting a consistent world by the reader or listener (the real, not implied, one). The unity of the work may 
be no more than an assumption the reader makes and tests in the process of reading. The assumption, however, 
is not optional, but necessary. lf the reader's experience is to have any coherence and unity at all, if it is to be a 
single (though not necessarily simple) experience rather than a series of completely unrelated experiences, it must 
refer to a single (though not necessarily simple) object. The ultimate unity of the work, no matter how difficult 
to establish or how precariously maintained, is an assumption the reader or listener must make and the work 
must in sorne way, however reluctantly, partially, or imperfectly, confirrn. lfwe assume that what we read or 
hear is a single work and not a collection of several unrelated works, then it is seif-evident that what the work 
presents must be at the most fundamental level a single world. 8 (To be sure, this world can have different 
ontological levels, different sub-worlds, ifyou will. But precisely because these different levels are hierarchically 
related, they constitute jointly an ultimately single world.) The unity of the work and the unity of the world 
presented in it are inextricably linked. The unity of the work consists, precisely, in the fact that the work 
presents an ultimately single world. No matter how multi-layered or fragmented the presented world is, so long 
as the reader believes that he reads a single work rather than a collection ofworks, he must assume that the work 
presents what at the most fundamental level is a single world. 
In sum, the setting, the personage, and the narrator exhaust the !ist of categories of elements that may 
constitute, singly or in various combinations, the world presented in the work. The only kind of author whose 
existence is implied by the work is the real one. The latter figure, however, like the Deus absconditus of the 
Jansenists, cannot enter the world presented in his work, though, like any other part of the real world, he can 
serve as the rnodel of a portrait, that is, become a personage, or narrator, or both. This, I believe, allows us to 
separate truth from exaggeration in the century-long critical tradition proclaiming, in the phrase of Roland 
Barthes, «the death ofthe authorn.9 The notion ofthe implied author was one ofthose characteristic devices that 
from Flaubert to New Criticism and beyond served to keep the real author and real history at bay, to 
decontextualize the text and the work. By putting th is notion aside, we make room for the real author and we 
retum the text, the work, and its world to the messy contexts of actual historical worlds in which they came into 
existence and in which they continue to function. 
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